60 Years Ago Today - Mexico City

Part 36

Lee Harvey Oswald’s visit to Mexico City 27 September - 2 October 1963 is shrouded in mystery. We know he had a series of meetings at the Cuban and Soviets Embassies on the 27th and 28th. We do not know independently what happened in those meetings or whether there were other meetings later. We cannot take at face value what the Cubans and Soviets said publicly after the assassination because they had an interest in making themselves look good by spinning events or making up stories.

So, I will start with what we know happened. Then, I will add what I think is plausible to have happened and why I think it is plausible. I leave it to the reader to judge.

Friday, 27 September

We know that Oswald arrived in Mexico City on Red Arrow bus #516 circa 10:00 AM on the 27th. Circa 11:00 AM, he checked into a hotel rarely used by Americans, the Hotel del Comercio on Calle Bernardino four blocks from the bus stop. After check-in, he proceeded to the Consular Section of the Cuban Embassy on Calle Francisco Marquez, eight blocks away.

We also know that at some point, Oswald volunteered to the Cuban Embassy officials he met that he would kill President Kennedy for Fidel Castro. We know this because Castro himself confided it to Jack Childs of the American Communist Party in 1964 and Childs secretly reported Castro’s comment to the FBI.

It is plausible - I think almost certain - that Oswald first met with Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez and/or Manuel Vega Perez, two Cuban intelligence officers assigned undercover to the Consular Section. All intelligence services place undercover officers in their consular sections to screen visa applicants for persons of intelligence interest. In 1963, any American was of intelligence interest to Cuba especially one who spoke Russian and claimed to support Castro.

We know that Rodriguez Lopez and Vega Perez were authorized to grant visas to anyone they thought might be useful. For some reason, though, Oswald was directed to apply via the regular process. Accordingly, he applied to Ms. Silvia Duran, a Mexican national who had only been working at the Consular Section for a few weeks. Ms. Duran told Oswald that the only visa she could issue him on short notice was a transit visa to stop in Cuba on the way to the Soviet Union. For her to do so, Oswald needed a valid Soviet entry visa.

Angry and frustrated, Oswald departed the Cuban Embassy circa 12:15 and made his way to the nearby Soviet Embassy, arriving circa 12:30, a half hour before it closed for the weekend. Normally, the Soviet Consular Section would not receive visitors without an appointment, but an exception was made for this Russian speaking American of possible intelligence interest. Oswald met with Valery Vladimirovich Kostikov. We know this in part because the Soviets published a 1993 book about it, Passport to Assassination. The book is full of disinformation but does include a few tell-tale facts.

Kostikov was a KGB intelligence officer likewise assigned undercover in the consular section. His real job was as the Mexico City representative of KGB Department 13. Department 13 was mainly responsible for sabotage operations and Kostikov probably oversaw Oswald the KGB saboteur in Texas during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Department 13 had a secondary responsibility for assassinations, mainly against Soviet dissidents.

We know that Oswald and Kostikov talked but we don’t know what they talked about. It is revealing, however, that the Soviets smuggled Oswald out of the Consular Section so that CIA-financed, Mexican surveillance cameras would not get a photo of him departing.

Sometime after 2:00 PM, Oswald returned to the Cuban Consular Section. Although it had already closed for the weekend, Oswald was somehow permitted to enter and speak again with Ms. Duran. Oswald claimed that he had been promised an entry visa by the Soviet Embassy but had not yet received it. He tried to convince Ms. Duran to issue the Cuban transit visa so that he could catch the flight to Havana the next day. Ms. Duran made a telephone call to Kostikov to verify if Oswald’s claim was true (it was not). This telephone line was monitored by the CIA, and Kostikov understood it to be so monitored.

Saturday, 28 September

Circa 9:30 AM the next day, Saturday, Oswald returned to the Soviet Embassy and was again permitted to enter even though the Embassy was closed. Oswald was inside until at least 11:00 AM speaking with Kostikov and two other KGB officers. As a result of this unusual after-hours meeting with Oswald, all three of these KGB officers missed the cherished weekly volleyball game between the KGB team and the GRU military intelligence team. Again, the Soviets smuggled Oswald out so the surveillance cameras could not photograph him.

Oswald remained in Mexico City three more days. He called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October to check on the status of his visa request. Otherwise, we have no idea what he was doing during this time or whether he had other meetings outside of the embassies with the Cubans and/or Soviets.

What is and is not Plausible

It is not plausible that Cuban intelligence would give a flat ‘no’ to Oswald’s offer to kill President Kennedy for Fidel Castro. Castro knew Kennedy was trying to kill him and had publicly threatened to retaliate.

Nor is it plausible that Cuban intelligence would give a flat ‘yes’ to Oswald’s offer. Oswald’s chances of success were miniscule (remember he couldn’t hit General Walker sitting 40 yards away). More importantly, a professional intelligence service would never take such a huge risk relying on someone like Oswald - and Cuban intelligence is extremely professional.

What is plausible is that Cuban intelligence might wish Oswald well on his self-initiated plot, agree to stay in touch, but keep their distance.

Regardless, something suspicious happened in Mexico City between Oswald, the Cubans, and the Soviets. The CIA knew it and both Cuban intelligence and the KGB knew that the CIA knew it. Mexico City implicated the Cubans and the Soviets in what Oswald did whether they were involved in what he did or not.